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Donovan Mioyasaki
Both Theodor Adorno and Walter
Benjamin borrow from Freudian theory in
their analyses of fetishism’s relation to the
contemporary reception of cultural prod-
ucts. I will argue that both authors have con-
fused the Marxian and Freudian theories of
fetishism, resulting in mistaken conclusions
about artistic reception. By disentangling
the Marxian and Freudian elements in both
authors’ positions, I want to show that 1)
Adorno’s characterization of regressive lis-
tening implies, contrary to his intentions,
that the current reception of artwork is in fact
antagonistic to fetishism, and that 2) his crit-
icism of Benjamin’s optimism toward “re-
ception in distraction” is nevertheless justi-
fied. If I am correct, it may be necessary to
reassess Adorno’s demand for asceticism in
advanced art. The current danger may not be
“fetishism” at all, but rather the troublesome
consequences of fetishism’s decline.
The Marxian Fetish of Commodity
Alienation
According to Marx, a laborer’s product
becomes a commodity when produced for
the purpose of exchange rather than direct
use. He compares the commodity to a reli-
gious fetish because “the productions of the
human brain appear as independent beings
endowed with life, entering into relation
both with one another and the human race.”1
However, this is not simply an illusion. Marx
claims the commodity’s fetishistic appear-
ance is both true and false: “the relations
connecting the labor of one individual with
that of the rest appear, not as direct social re-
lations between individuals at work, but as
what they really are, material relations be-
tween persons and social relations between
things” (emphasis mine).2 Given the private
production of capitalism, it is true that labor-
ers relate to one another indirectly through
the exchange of material goods. Their social
relations are material relations. The workers’
alienation from the commodity—its seem-
ing lack of direct relation to their labor—
truthfully reflects the workers’ alienation
from one another.
At the same time, commodity fetishism is
illusive because this impoverished social re-
lationship between laborers is attributed to
commodities: “a definite social relation be-
tween men, assumes, in their eyes, the fan-
tastic form of a relation between things.”3
The concrete labor-relations of humans, the
very source of commodities and their value,
go unnoticed in the commodity’s abstract
exchange-value. Because the link of the
commodity’s exchangeability to actual hu-
man activity is shrouded, “the process of
production has the mastery over man, in-
stead of being controlled by him.”4 The illu-
sion is not this mastery (just as it is not illu-
sory that the religious fetishist is subservient
to the fetish-god); what is illusory is the im-
plication that such a state of affairs is a
“self-evident necessity imposed by nature.”5
The commodity, seemingly disconnected
from the worker’s activity, takes on the char-
acter of external necessity or independent
law; its existence and value appear to fall
outside the realm of human control. Conse-
quently, the fetishistic commodity falsely
implies the impossibility of social change.
The Freudian Fetish:
The Fantasy of Reconciliation
The Freudian theory of fetishism empha-
sizes, not alienation, but the illusion of a re-
lation. Freud traces the origins of sexual fe-
tishism to the castration complex. He claims
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that a young boy, upon discovering that
women do not possess a penis, interprets this
fact as a verification of the threat of castra-
tion. In order to preserve his relation of de-
sire to the mother without endangering his
own body, he must reject this lack: “The fe-
tish is a substitute for the woman’s
(mother’s) penis that the little boy once be-
lieved in and . . . does not want to give up.”6
The fetish is substituted for the mother’s pe-
nis, Freud tells us, “to preserve it from ex-
tinction.”7
As in Marx’s view, fetishism is related to a
substitution. Here the fetish is substituted for
the “maternal phallus,” rather than ex-
change-value substituting for the social rela-
tions of labor.8 But while in Marx this substi-
tution causes a loss of social relation to the
object and to others (the commodity’s auton-
omous, alienated character), in Freud the
substitute seemingly prevents the loss of a
social relation (prevents alienation from the
opposite gender). Marx explains his use of
the term “fetishism” by emphasizing the di-
vorce of the object from the subject (the fe-
tish-god’s independence). Freud, on the
other hand, emphasizes the subject’s belief
that the fetish overcomes this divorce. “Such
substitutes,” he says, “are with some justice
likened to the fetishes in which savages be-
lieve that their gods are embodied” (my em-
phasis).9
Marx and Freud do agree in their analyses
of the objective social situation of fetishism.
In both cases, false relations substitute for
authentic ones. They are “false” because
they involve the loss of authentic satisfaction
in social relationships. The commodity rela-
tionship of laborers is an impoverished ma-
terial relation between subjects, rather than
an authentic social relation. The relation of
the Freudian fetishist to the fetish is also a
degraded one; the fetishist’s desire is di-
rected toward an object—a thing without di-
rect relation to his desire. In Marx, the alien-
ating social relationships of capitalism
substitute for authentic society, and in Freud
submission to an object substitutes for the
authentic sexual aim of an erotic bond to a
human subject.10
The difference between the two theories
lies in the subjective conditions—in the fe-
tishistic subjects’perception of their own sit-
uation. In Marx, the producers encounter the
substitute of the commodity as alienated and
without relation to them. They see in the ob-
ject their own loss of social satisfaction. The
danger is not this substitution, which reveals
their social privation. It is instead the com-
modity’s independence, which convinces
the subjects that the loss cannot be remedied,
that commodity relations are the only possi-
ble human relation. In Freud, on the con-
trary, the subject is unaware of alienation or
loss because he has transferred his desire
from the mother to the fetish. Far from alien-
ating him, the object reassures him that the
desired relation has been achieved. Rather
than despairing of alternatives, he simply
does not recognize the need for any. The
danger is heightened because he ignores his
privation.
The Marxian and Freudian theories of fe-
tishism analyze two different ways in which
subjects can react to the loss of social rela-
tion. Because my principal concern is the de-
fensive attitude taken by the subject toward
the condition of social deprivation, rather
than that condition itself, I will reserve the
term “fetishism” for the Freudian theory, and
“alienation” for the Marxian one. In the
Freudian sense, there is nothing fetishistic
about Marxian commodity alienation.
Marx’s producer is aware of alienation and
resigns, in the face of the commodity’s illu-
sory authority, to the loss of social happi-
ness. Freudian fetishism, on the contrary, is
not resignation toward a dissatisfying substi-
tute form of society. It is instead a substitute
satisfaction, or false reconciliation.
Benjamin and the Theory of Aura
Benjamin’s notion of “aura” corresponds
to the substitute social relation of the fetish,
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and not to Marxian commodity alienation.
According to Benjamin, the auratic work of
art is an object appearing as a subject: “Ex-
perience of the aura rests on the transposi-
tion of a response common in human rela-
tionships to the relationship between the
inanimate or natural object and man.”11 As in
fetishism, the aura of an object is its ability to
substitute for a subject in the social relation.
Unlike Marx’s alienated commodities,
which seem to have relations only with one
another while being divorced from the sub-
ject and her labor, in the auratic object the
subject recognizes herself, seeing humanity
rather than a mere thing: “to perceive the
aura of an object we look at means to invest it
with the ability to look at us in return.”12
As with fetishism, the relation to the ob-
ject disguises an impoverished social rela-
tion between subjects. On one hand, both the
fetish and the auratic object distance human
beings from one other. Aura, Benjamin says,
is essentially an experience of distance, and
“the essentially distant is the inapproach-
able.”13 On the other hand, however, the sub-
ject’s distance from other subjects is dis-
guised by the unique presence and
authenticity of the object.14 Just as the Freud-
ian fetishist believes he has achieved satis-
faction in the presence of the fetish, the sub-
ject in the presence of the auratic artwork
believes she has entered into a relation with
lost social human experience: “the authen-
ticity of a thing is the essence of all that is
transmissible from its beginning, ranging
from its substantive duration to its testimony
to the history which it has experienced.”15
The auratic object appears, then, as an ex-
ception to the commodity. Rather than
cloaking its history of production, use, and
exchange—that is, its connection to human
life—under the abstract quantity of ex-
change-value, it wears its history on its
sleeve. Its value is inseparable from its past
concrete relations to subjects. Like the fe-
tish, aura is distance and alienation in the
guise of proximity and humanity. It is not
alienation but false reconciliation.
Adorno and the Fetish of
Exchange-Value
As in Benjamin’s case, Adorno’s analysis
of fetishism in cultural goods has more in
common with Freudian fetishism than
Marxian commodity alienation. According
to Adorno, commodity fetishism is the con-
sumption of exchange-value under the guise
of use-value:
If the commodity in general combines ex-
change-value and use-value, then the pure
use-value, whose illusion the cultural
goods must preserve in completely capital-
ist society, must be replaced by pure ex-
change-value, which deceptively takes
over the function of use-value. . . . The feel-
ings which go to the exchange value create
the appearance of immediacy at the same
time as the absence of a relation to the ob-
ject belies it.16 (my emphasis)
The exchange-value of the commodity is the
fetishistic substitute for the satisfaction one
desires from the product’s qualitative
use-value. The consumer has replaced the
object of desire with the desire to exchange.
As in sexual fetishism, where the fetish ob-
ject replaces the sexual aim (means replaces
end), the commodity is desired qua ex-
changeable (the means) rather than as
use-value (the end). Adorno even borrows
Freudian terminology to describe the phe-
nomenon: “as a result of the displacement of
feelings into exchange-value, no demands
are really advanced in music anymore. Sub-
stitutes satisfy their purpose, because the de-
mand to which they adjust themselves has it-
self already been substituted.” (emphasis
added).17
The crucial difference between Marxian
alienation and Adorno’s Freudian use of “fe-
tishism” is the subject’s perception of her sit-
uation. In Marx, the subject recognizes in the
commodity a real inadequacy in her social
condition. Relations appear “as they really
are, material relations between persons and
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social relations between things.”18 In
Adorno, on the contrary, this element of
truth is clouded; the commodity becomes il-
lusory through and through. The subject sees
nothing lacking in the commodity or in her
relationship to it. As with Benjamin’s auratic
object, exchange-value—the alienation of
producers from their products—takes on the
disguise of relation. However, for Adorno,
the substitute is no longer an auratic connec-
tion to historical use, but the illusion of a
present and immediate utility—a direct
qualitative relation to the object.
Both Benjamin’s aura and Adorno’s com-
modity fetishism are defensive strategies
against Marxian alienation, since both
falsely suggest authentic social satisfaction
achieved in relation to an object. However,
Benjamin’s aura still includes nostalgia for a
relation to tradition and human experience,
i.e., for a social relation to other subjects via
the object, whereas Adorno’s consumer
gives up the other subject entirely, imagining
full satisfaction in the object alone, in its ap-
pearance as pure use-value.19
Benjamin’s Diagnosis of
Aura’s Decline
In both Benjamin and Adorno’s positions,
the danger is the subject’s ignorance of ac-
tual privation. If fetishism were a final state
of affairs, the outlook for social change
would be grim, since the need for change
would go unrecognized. However,
Benjamin has given us reason to believe fe-
tishism is not, in fact, the end of the matter.
His claim of a “disintegration of the aura”
implies a decline of fetishism.20
According to Benjamin, mechanical re-
production destroys the distance that main-
tains aura. Because the reproduced object is
easily and inexpensively possessed, it incites
and satisfies “the desire of contemporary
masses to bring things ‘closer’ spatially and
humanly . . . to get hold of an object at very
close range by way of its likeness, its repro-
duction.”21 This might, at first glance, appear
to reinforce fetishism. After all, it is charac-
teristic of fetishism to seek to obtain
satisfaction by possessing a substitute. And
indeed, this desire to abolish distance is mo-
tivated by auratic fetishism. However, it is
also fetishism’s self-defeat.
The changes that come with the object’s
immediate availability destroy precisely that
character that made the object function as a
substitute. The nostalgic illusion of a con-
nection to social experience is upheld by the
auratic object’s historical and unique charac-
ter. It comforts by showing a seemingly hu-
man face. With the advance of mechanical
reproduction, however, the human qualities
of the commodity dissolve. Because repro-
duced commodities are flawless, new, and
identical—lacking uniqueness or history—
“the technique of reproduction detaches the
reproduced object from the domain of tradi-
tion.”22 The object is brought too close for its
magic—the appearance of humanness and
sociability—to be preserved. The fetish is
appropriated only to become an empty com-
modity without relation to human experi-
ence.
The consequence of this decline is an au-
thentically Marxian form of alienation. Ac-
cording to Benjamin, the auratic object’s
conversion to commodity takes the form of
and “experience of shock.”23 The object’s
proximity, coupled with its absence of con-
nection to the human, is experienced as
pain—as the constant threat of danger.
Benjamin’s favorite analogy for this experi-
ence is big city traffic: “Moving through this
traffic involves the individual in a series of
shocks and collisions. At dangerous inter-
sections, nervous impulses flow through him
in rapid succession, like the energy from a
battery.”24 The comforting traces of past so-
cial experience that had relieved the social
situation begin to disappear. The subject has
not voluntarily given up fetishism; objective
conditions have made such evasive strategies
increasingly difficult. What once, as aura,
returned the human gaze, now confronts the
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Benjamin’s analysis of aura’s decline and
conversion to shock introduces a non-fetish-
istic subjective response to alienation. This
alternative to fetishism is drawn explicitly
from Freud’s theory of traumatic neurosis in
Beyond the Pleasure Principle.25 Freud
claims that victims of war trauma repeatedly
dream about their traumatic experiences in
order to overcome shock: “these dreams are
endeavouring to master the stimulus retro-
spectively, by developing the anxiety whose
omission was the cause of the traumatic neu-
rosis.”26 In a similar way, the subject’s expe-
rience of shock in the alienated commodity
is countered in two ways: 1) by habituating
to shock through its repetition, and 2) by
identifying with the active agent that pro-
duced the shock.
According to Benjamin, modern cultural
products serve as preparation for the safe re-
ception and ultimate mastery of shock:
“technology has subjected the human
sensorium to a complex kind of training.
There came a day when a new and urgent
need for stimuli was met by the film.”27 He
compares this trained reception of shock to
tactile, as opposed to visual and contempla-
tive, appropriation:
This mode of appropriation, developed
with reference to architecture, in certain
circumstances acquires canonical value.
For the tasks which face the human appara-
tus of perception at the turning points of
history cannot be solved by optical means,
that is, by contemplation alone. They are
mastered by habit, under the guidance of
tactile appropriation.28
The consequence of this curious training is a
new kind of artistic reception:
The painting invites the spectator to con-
templation; before it the spectator can
abandon himself to his associations. Be-
fore the movie frame he cannot do so. No
sooner has his eye grasped a scene than it is
already changed. It cannot be arrested. . . .
This constitutes the shock effect of the
film, which like all shocks, should be cush-
ioned by heightened presence of mind.29
(my emphases)
Benjamin misleadingly calls this behav-
ior “reception in a state of distraction.”30 But
distraction is not, in his sense, a state of un-
consciousness or a lack of perception. On the
contrary, it is closer to attention, alertness, or
being on guard. It is called “distraction” be-
cause one is constantly attending to changes
of scene, disruptions, and disconnections
that make immersed contemplation impossi-
ble. Habituation to such disruptions allows
one to experience shock effects without be-
ing harmed by them. By anticipating shock,
one is ready for it and immune to it. One be-
comes impervious—a “shock absorber” of
sorts. Such reception includes both attention
and distraction in the same way that the
Freudian trauma patient is dreaming and
preoccupied, although alert to the source of
her suffering.
“Reception in a state of distraction” is, in
fact, the precondition of non-fetishistic re-
ception. Through habit, the subject develops
the capacity to withstand alienation and dis-
pleasure. This is contrary to fetishistic recep-
tion, in which the threatening perception of
alienation is evaded through false reconcilia-
tion in the fetish substitute. In non-fetishistic
“distraction” one is distracted by and atten-
tive to the shock of privation. One acknowl-
edges precisely those elements of the social
condition that fetishism ignores—the com-
fortless tactile stimuli that “hit the spectator
like a bullet,”31 the collisions of the crowd,
street and factory, and the sudden disrup-
tions of scene or camera angle that defy the
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fetishistic illusion of human, auratic experi-
ence.
One is distracted from, on the other hand,
precisely the auratic and fetishistic substi-
tutes that disavow, cover, or draw attention
away from shock. “The film,” Benjamin
claims, “makes the cult value recede into the
background.”32 The subject is distracted
from the harmonic image of the auratic that
allows for comfortable contemplation, from
the illusion that makes her incapable of tol-
erating what belies aura. As Benjamin puts
it, “the man who concentrates before a work
of art is absorbed by it. . . . In contrast, the
distracted mass absorbs the work of art.”33 To
concentrate upon and be absorbed by a work
requires that the work be non-threatening; it
must have the fetishistic quality of an object
become human, returning and reassuring
one’s gaze. A work that distracts, on the con-
trary, defies this fetishistic pseudo-relation.
Its shock constantly reinforces the division
between the subject and the commodity.
This acknowledgement and mastery of
privation is the precondition of the move
from passivity to activity. We have seen that,
for Marx, the alienated subject believes she
is powerless before the independent laws of
the commodity. However, the subject’s re-
peated exposure and habituation to alien-
ation is the objective possibility of reconcili-
ation. In this way the subject overcomes
submissiveness to, and fear of, the alienated
commodity. In the training of repeated
shocks she subjects herself to the object,
rather than being subjected to the object. She
is training for the assumption of an active
role.
Once again, Benjamin has drawn heavily
from Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle.
There Freud describes a game in which a
young boy throws a toy away from him with
a cry of “fort” (“gone”), and retrieves it again
with a cry of “da” (“there”). Freud interprets
the game as a reenactment of the mother’s
temporary departure and return. It is, he
says,
related to the child’s great cultural achieve-
ment—the instinctual renunciation . . .
which he had made in allowing his mother
to go away without protesting. . . . At the
outset he was in a passive situation—he
was overpowered by the experience; but,
by repeating it, unpleasurable though it
was, as a game, he took on an active part.34
The child not only tolerates the loss, but also
causes it to occur again in the game. He iden-
tifies with the mother’s role. It is now the
child that takes leave, not the mother. By
making this identification, he anticipates his
move from the passive demand for immedi-
ate satisfaction under the pleasure principle
to the toleration of privation under the reality
principle. Such toleration is essential if the
child is to recognize the reality of his priva-
tion and eventually, through activity, modify
the reality that causes his displeasure.
The contrast to fetishism is striking. The
fetishist refuses to acknowledge shock, and
thus maintains the illusion that no change in
social condition is required. The pleasure
principle, passivity, and immediate gratifica-
tion determine the fetishist’s actions. Repeti-
tion of shock and identification are, on the
contrary, an anticipation of the reality princi-
ple, self-command, and the modification of
the real. In Freudian theory, it is precisely
such a strategy that will allow a child to re-
solve the Oedipus complex without resort-
ing to the evasive strategy of fetishism.
Whereas the fetishist preserves the prohib-
ited desire by finding a substitute object, the
“normal” child will identify with the father
and reenact the father’s prohibition actively,
rather than be subjected to it: “the child’s
parents, and especially his father, were per-
ceived as the obstacle to a realization of his
Oedipus wishes; so his infantile ego fortified
itself for the carrying out of the repression by
erecting this same obstacle within itself.”35
In Benjamin’s analysis, this identification
involves positioning oneself, not as passive
recipient or audience member, but rather as
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author, camera, or critic: “the audience’s
identification with the actor is really an iden-
tification with the camera. Consequently the
audience takes the position of the camera; its
approach is that of testing.”36 Benjamin even
suggests that every audience member be-
comes “somewhat of an expert.”37 For our
purposes, the audience’s true status as expert
is not crucial. What is crucial is that by both
recognizing its alienation and identifying
with the agent of its alienation (the produc-
ers of the commodity), the audience is pre-
paring for the activities of judgment, produc-
tion, and modification of commodities.
Two important conclusions can be drawn.
First, the repetition of shock makes the fe-
tishistic evasion of shock unnecessary. Sec-
ond, imaginative identification with agency
is preparatory to the overcoming of Marxian
alienation. It is, to be sure, only an imaginary
step. Identification is not authentic agency.
Nevertheless, imagined agency truthfully
suggests the possibility of a changed relation
to the commodity. The subject has, to some
degree, recognized her potential to act of her
own accord, rather than in obedience to an
actual, but historically conditioned, state of
affairs.
Resistance to Fetishism in Adorno’s
Analysis of “Regressive Listening”
Like Benjamin, Adorno acknowledges
the presence of alienation, shock, and dis-
pleasure in the relation of the subject to the
commodity. He calls the reception of the
alienated commodity “regressive listening”:
Regressive listening appears as soon as ad-
vertising turns to terror, as soon as nothing
is left for the consciousness but to capitu-
late before the superior power of the adver-
tised stuff and purchase spiritual peace by
making the imposed goods literally its own
thing. In regressive listening, advertising
takes on a compulsory character.38 (my em-
phasis)
Like Benjamin, he claims that the subject’s
reception of the shock of alienation involves
identification. However, contrary to
Benjamin, Adorno claims the subject identi-
fies with the commodity itself, not with the
commodity’s producer:
They overcome the feeling of impotence
that creeps over them in the face of monop-
olistic production by identifying them-
selves with the inescapable product. They
thereby put an end to the strangeness of the
musical brands which are at once distant
from them and threateningly near.39 (my
emphasis)
While Benjamin believes that the reception
of shock distracts the subject from auratic or
fetishistic qualities, Adorno insists that “re-
gressive listening” supports the continued
success of fetishism, even given the decline
of aura. The subject can fetishistically iden-
tify with the commodity—that is, continue
to see in it a relation to the human—because
she mistakes exchange-value (the commod-
ity’s being-for-exchange) for use-value (its
being-for-human use). However, Adorno’s
own analysis provides reasons to reject this
claim. The regression of listening is not, as
he says, a “counterpart to the fetishism of
music.”40 It is, instead, at odds with fetish-
ism.
According to Adorno, regressive listen-
ing is the rejection from consciousness of
difference—of anything that defies com-
modification or exposes alternatives to it:
Whenever they have the chance, they dis-
play the pinched hatred of those who really
sense the other but exclude it in order to
live in peace, and who therefore would like
best to root out the nagging possibility. The
regression is really from this existent pos-
sibility, or more concretely from the possi-




He even explicitly characterizes regressive
listening as a neurosis:
There is actually a neurotic mechanism of
stupidity in listening too; the arrogantly ig-
norant rejection of everything unfamiliar is
its sure sign. Regressive listeners behave
like children. Again and again, and with
stubborn malice, they demand the one dish
they have been served.42
In regressive listening, as in both neurosis
and psychosis, something is prevented from
reaching consciousness.43 However, this dis-
avowal of alternatives is inconsistent with
fetishism. The very motivation of fetishism
is to preserve a sexual relation without re-
sorting to either repression of instinct or the
disavowal of external reality.44 The sexual fe-
tishist fully believes that it is the fetish he
wants, and nothing else. Consequently he
has no need to deny the reality of an alterna-
tive to the fetish.45
In Adorno’s theory, the substitution of ex-
change-value for use-value accomplishes
the same. Alternatives to the fetishistic satis-
faction of the commodity pose no threat to
the fetishist, and need not be rejected by con-
sciousness. Although both the disavowal of
external reality and fetishism counteract the
temptation to indulge in a prohibited satis-
faction, they do so in entirely different ways.
The disavowal of alternative satisfaction
makes fetishism unnecessary (because one
cannot be tempted by unperceived alterna-
tives), and fetishism makes disavowal un-
necessary (because one no longer desires the
alternatives). If it were true, as Adorno
claims, that the subject has fetishistically
identified with the commodity, then the re-
fusal to be conscious of alternatives would
be superfluous.
But disavowal of alternatives is not sim-
ply inconsistent with fetishism; it is incom-
patible with fetishism. According to
Adorno, the fetishist believes pleasure in the
exchange-value of the commodity is actually
pleasure taken in the qualitative use-value of
the product. That is, the fetishist is unaware
of a distinction between product enjoyed qua
commodity or enjoyed qua use-value. Be-
cause this distinction is not recognized, any
pleasure incidentally occasioned by
use-value will not be distinguished from the
substitute pleasure taken in exchange-value.
The fetishist may be conscious of the alter-
native (she may experience non-fetishistic
pleasure), but she will not be conscious of it
as an alternative. To use an example of
Adorno’s, a fetishistic concertgoer will not
see any difference between enjoyment in the
price of a concert ticket and enjoyment in the
music performed.46 Fetishism only succeeds
because the fetishist does not distinguish au-
thentic from false satisfactions.
Because regressive listeners compul-
sively disavow alternatives to the fetishistic
commodity, then they must, unlike the fe-
tishist, be capable of distinguishing the fe-
tishistic from the non-fetishistic, ex-
change-value from use-value. After all, the
alternatives cannot be rejected unless recog-
nized as alternatives. The listener excludes
difference “in order to live in peace” and
“root out the nagging possibility.”47 But dif-
ference can only pose a threat to the lis-
tener’s peace provided she is able to recog-
nize it as a desirable alternative—precisely
what the fetishist does not recognize. Conse-
quently, the regressive listener’s relation to
the commodity cannot be one of fetishistic
pleasure in a substitute. It is, rather, one of
resignation toward acknowledged privation.
Such resignation in the face of commod-
ity alienation is characteristic of Marx’s
analysis, and antagonistic to the fetishism
described by Freud and Adorno. Further-
more, the consumers’ compulsive return to
the alienated commodity is characteristic of
Benjamin and Freud’s descriptions of
non-fetishistic shock training. So Adorno’s
notion of disavowal in regressive listening
demonstrates, against his intentions, that fe-




as Benjamin has claimed.
The Critique of Non-Fetishistic
Reconciliation: Pathological Realism
Advancements in commodity production
lead to the decline of auratic fetishism.
Given the necessity of disavowal in regres-
sive listening, a similar decline must occur in
the case of exchange-value fetishism.
Adorno has even provided an excellent ex-
planation of the phenomenon. Commodity
fetishism leads to a condition in which “in
broad areas the same thing is offered to ev-
erybody by the standardized production of
consumption goods.”48 With increased stan-
dardization, it becomes increasingly diffi-
cult for exchange-value to take the disguise
of use-value; the difference between the two
becomes too glaring to support the fetishistic
substitution.49 Adorno mentions, for exam-
ple, mass music’s “standardized products,”
which “do not permit concentrated listening
without becoming unbearable to the listen-
ers.”
50 And he admits: “even the most insen-
sitive hit song enthusiast cannot always es-
cape the feeling that the child with a sweet
tooth comes to know in the candy store. . . .
Nobody believes so completely in pre-
scribed pleasure.”51
Given a decline in both fetishistic aura
and the fetishism of exchange-value, it
would seem that the problem has evaporated.
But we still have to contend with Marxian
commodity alienation. The crucial element
of Marx’s analysis is the illusion of necessity
and helplessness. Although no longer a fe-
tishist in Freud or Adorno’s sense, the re-
gressive listener still considers her condition
irreparable. She recognizes her alienation in
the commodity, but feels powerless to alter
it. The only defense against alienation that
apparently remains is the disavowal of alter-
natives. Because such alternatives appear to
the alienated consumer as merely exceptions
to the rule, lacking the commodity’s authori-
tative power, their difference can only aggra-
vate dissatisfaction with the ubiquitous com-
modity. Again, Adorno has provided an ex-
cellent explanation:
It suffices to remember how many sorrows
he is spared who no longer thinks too many
thoughts, how much more “in accordance
with reality” a person behaves when he af-
firms that the real is right, how much more
capacity to use the machinery falls to the
person who integrates himself uncom-
plainingly, so that the correspondence be-
tween the listener’s consciousness and the
fetishized music would still remain com-
prehensible even if the former did not un-
equivocally reduce itself to the latter.52
It is not, then, necessary for the subject to
buy into fetishism to be passive to the com-
modity. Though the regressive listener rec-
ognizes the inadequacy of the commodified
product, her recognition of a real state of af-
fairs (the primacy of the commodity over the
subject) leads her to the conclusion—to
some extent correct—that alternatives will
increase, not remedy, her dissatisfaction.
However, the subject’s resignation is only
partly “in accordance with reality.” It may be
true that producers are subservient to pro-
duction, but they are not necessarily so. It
may also be true that a product that defies
commodification is powerless and doomed
to extinction—but only given Marxian alien-
ation, which is not an objectively necessary
state of affairs.53
Regressive listening is not fetishistic sub-
stitute pleasure, but instead a paradoxical—
perhaps even pathological—adherence to
the reality principle. Or rather, it is the reality
principle turned against itself. The subject is
so energetically committed to the recogni-
tion of real privation (and thus to the rejec-
tion of fetishism) that she rejects as fantasy
anything in the real that defies the general
state of affairs. In her commitment to the re-
ality principle, she disavows possibility.
Rather than recognize that alternative prod-
ucts are evidence of the real power of pro-
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ducers over the commodity, the subject sees
them only as accidents or anomalies. She at-
tributes their existence (like that of the com-
modity in general) not to the agency of the
producer and consumer, but to the whims of
exchange and market. This pathological
form of realism, far from fetishistically con-
fusing alienation with satisfaction, reso-
lutely accepts privation as such. It is not the
illusion of satisfaction, but despair over the
possibility of alternatives. Any suggestion of
the possibility of value beyond exchange is
pathologically labeled pathology.
This “pathological realism” in regressive
listening provides the basis for a critique of
Benjamin’s optimistic theory of repeti-
tion-identification. The source of his opti-
mism is the subject’s identification with
agency. By identifying with the producer,
the alienated subject anticipates the ability to
take control of the commodity and modify
the condition of privation. Privation is toler-
ated only to bring about its end. But this is a
dangerous stra tegy. The Freudian
“introjection” of the father as superego is
identification with the father, not only as
agent, but also as the voice of prohibition.
In Freudian theory, the child’s instinctual
privation is necessary due to its dependence
upon its parents. However, through identifi-
cation this objective condition becomes a
subjective one—the father’s prohibition and
authority is moved from a perceived state of
reality to an internal psychical system. Al-
though this objective condition changes
when the child becomes an independent
adult, the superego’s prohibition does not.
Consequently, a conditional state of reality is
given illusive permanence through its
introjection. If the identification is too suc-
cessful, the child will not ultimately modify
the real to allow for satisfaction, but instead
simply take over the father’s job of prohibi-
tion, reinforcing the condition of privation.
Freud, unlike Benjamin, is careful to empha-
size this danger:
The more powerful the Oedipus complex
was and the more rapidly it succumbed to
repression (under the influence of author-
ity, religious teaching, schooling and read-
ing) the stricter will be the domination of
the super-ego over the ego later on—in the
form of conscience or perhaps of an uncon-
scious sense of guilt.54
The super-ego retained essential features
of the introjected persons—their strength,
their severity, their inclination to supervise
and to punish. As I have said elsewhere, it is
easily conceivable that, thanks to the diffu-
sion of instinct that occurs along with this in-
troduction into the ego, the severity was in-
creased. The super-ego—the conscience at
work in the ego—may then become harsh,
cruel and inexorable against the ego which is
in its charge.55
Adorno’s description of regressive listen-
ing fits Freud’s analysis of the excessively
severe super-ego. The regressive listener’s
refusal to recognize alternative qualities in
the commodity (and thus the possibility of
alternative forms of production) is a compul-
sive obedience to historical authority at the
expense of the reality principle. As we saw in
Benjamin’s theory, when the audience mas-
ters the shock of the commodity, the possi-
bility of controlling commodities becomes
objectively real. However, because consum-
ers have identified with the self-prohibitive
character of the alienated producer and not
with a truly active producer, they compul-
sively reject this possibility. Their eventual
activity, rather than being a rejection of
alienated production, is a repetition of it.
Adorno labels this “pseudo-activity,” or “the
imitative assimilation to commodity mod-
els.”56
If, as Freud claims, the super-ego takes on
the character of the models with which the
subject has identified, then Adorno is right to
criticize Benjamin’s theory of distracted lis-
tening. Although the audience is distracted
from the auratic qualities of the commodity,
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fetishism is no longer the problem. Distrac-
tion from fetishistic aura is also, like “regres-
sive listening,” a distraction from exceptions
and alternatives to the alienated commodity.
If the subject attends only to shock, and not
to the possibility of its removal, then identifi-
cation with the producer is training in
self-betrayal. Benjaminian “expertise” pre-
pares the subject for the expert reproduction
of the condition of alienation:
The new listeners resemble mechanics
who are simultaneously specialized and
capable of supplying their special skills to
unexpected places. . . . The more easily
they meet the demands of the day, the more
rigidly they are subordinated to that sys-
tem.57
Conclusion
Benjamin has, against Adorno, correctly
diagnosed a decline in Freudian-style fetish-
ism, a decline evidenced by the necessity of
the non-fetishistic strategy of disavowal of
alternatives. However, he is mistaken to im-
ply that the decline of aura involves a decline
in the Marxian version of commodity fetish-
ism. The distracted audience’s identification
with the expert or author does not break
down the illusion of the alienated commod-
ity’s authority. On the contrary, it may be the
active acceptance and reinforcement of that
authority. Benjamin’s audience members de-
velop a tolerance for shock and recognize the
product’s dependence upon the producer.
But this is not sufficient to cause a decline in
Marxian fetishism. They must also recog-
nize the producer’s possible independence
from the dominant mode of production—
that is, the producer’s ability to produce in a
new way.
Given Benjamin’s theory, such recogni-
tion is unlikely for two reasons. First, the au-
dience’s practiced ability to endure shock
and expert knowledge of current commodi-
ties significantly reduces the motivation to
transform production. Once the subject has
become accustomed to the alienated com-
modity, it is easier to adapt to the current
forms of production rather than to transform
them. Second, distracted listening involves
attention to shock or danger and distraction
from the illusory aura of social relation. Be-
cause the subject’s real condition is alien-
ation, it is only in the auratic qualities of
artworks or products that she can encounter
the possibility of an alternative. The auratic
is illusory as a seemingly present social rela-
tion, but not in its implication of the objec-
tive possibility of such a condition. While
Benjamin is quite aware of this element of
truth in the auratic,58 his own theories of dis-
tracted reception and the decline of aura sug-
gest that the truth of the auratic is likely to go
unnoticed by the subject.
Adorno, on the contrary, is painfully
aware of this difficulty. He wisely rejects the
notion that repetitive-identification with
commodity models will lead to the overcom-
ing of Marxian alienation. And he correctly
points out that the changes in reception
noted by Benjamin are in accordance with
the authority of the alienated commodity and
tend to preserve Marxian alienation. How-
ever, he mistakenly believes that regressive
listening includes and supports fetishism in
the Freudian sense, leading him to reject
Benjamin’s theory of a decline of fetishism.
Adorno’s mistaken view of contemporary
reception has troublesome consequences for
his demands upon contemporary artwork.
The danger of the contemporary situation is
not fetishism, but what I have called the
“pathological realism” of regressive listen-
ing. The danger of distracted or regressive
reception is that the preparation for an active
relation to production involves repeated en-
counters with alienating products and identi-
fication with alienated producers. The lack
of attention to products that resist alienation
is also an incapacity to recognize the possi-
bility of alternative products and forms of
production. Trained in the alienated produc-
tion of alienating commodities, the subject’s
potential activity is likely to maintain the
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condition of social privation. If Marxian
alienation can be overcome, it can only be by
the audience’s repeated exposure to excep-
tions to alienated production. In Freudian
language, they must form their “super-egos”
by identification with the producers of alter-
native cultural products.
However, Adorno’s demands upon con-
temporary artwork imply precisely the op-
posite. He claims that regressive listeners re-
ceive artworks in a vulgarized way—as a
collection of isolated, culinary moments
rather than as a synthesis of those moments.
In its reception, the artwork becomes one
commodity among others:
No longer do the partial moments serve as
a critique of the whole; instead they sus-
pend the critique which the successful es-
thetic totality exerts against the flawed one
of society. . . . They [isolated moments of
enjoyment] are not bad in themselves but
in their diversionary function. In the ser-
vice of success they renounce that insubor-
dinate character which was theirs.59
On Adorno’s view, this conversion of the art-
work into commodity is fetishistic; immedi-
ate pleasure in isolated, enjoyable moments
enhances the illusion of achieved satisfac-
tion and obviates the need for social change
(as well as the need to attend to the work as a
whole).
I have argued, on the contrary, that regres-
sive listening is not fetishistic. If regressive
listeners are diverted by the isolated mo-
ments of the work, it is not because the mo-
ments provide substitute gratification, but
because (as Adorno has himself claimed) an
artwork as a whole presents an alternative to
the commodity, and threatens the listeners’
complaisance to alienation. Consequently,
the conversion in listening of the artwork
into commodity simply means that the lis-
teners have missed the work’s critique, not
that they have undermined it by finding fe-
tishistic satisfaction in it. The audience ei-
ther does not find anything at all or receives
the artwork as identical to any other com-
modity—that is, as a tolerated privation of
full satisfaction. If this is correct, then the
vulgarization of the artwork in listening does
not  encourage  fetishistic  illusion.  Admit-
tedly, the artwork will have little critical im-
pact on the audience, but it will not, at least,
have a negative one. The individual “mo-
ments” of the artwork lose their once “insub-
ordinate character,” but they do not “con-
spire against freedom.”60 They become
innocuous, not pernicious.
Adorno’s conviction that the partial mo-
ments of the artwork have pernicious effects
grounds his demand for an advanced, “as-
cetic” form of artwork that “has renounced
consumption.”61 The traitorous “moments of
enjoyment” (he also calls them moments of
gaiety, impulse, sensuality, charm, etc.—see
272–74) must be eliminated from the art-
work. This demand changes the entire nature
of the artwork’s critique. Originally, the syn-
thesis of these subjective moments in the
unified work presented “the image of a so-
cial condition in which above those particu-
lar moments of happiness would be more
than mere appearance.”62 But when the mo-
ments of happiness are excised, the image of
possible social reconciliation is lost. The ad-
vanced work of art instead “records nega-
tively” the possibility of happiness: “the
promise of happiness, once the definition of
art, can no longer be found except where the
mask has been torn from the countenance of
false happiness.”63 The ascetic work of art
provides a non-fetishistic image of our real
condition rather than a hopeful image of pos-
sible alternatives to that condition.
However, Adorno has repeated
Benjamin’s mistake. Both thinkers seek to
overcome the fetishistic illusion of happi-
ness, a danger that is already in decline. As
we have seen in our criticism of Benjamin’s
theory, the danger is precisely the oppo-
site—the despair of the possibility of happi-
ness. What is needed in order to bring about
reconciliation is the presentation of alterna-
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tive satisfaction—precisely what Adorno
has forbidden in art. The ascetic artwork that
Adorno endorses tells the subject precisely
what she already knows too well: that the
current condition is one of alienation and
dissatisfaction. More importantly, the as-
cetic work reinforces the regressive lis-
tener’s belief that the current condition is the
only possible one. The listener’s despair is
grounded in the faithful perception of real
conditions. If artistic asceticism decreases
the number of exceptions to alienation en-
countered in the real, then the true danger—
the illusion of alienation’s necessity—will
be reinforced. By renouncing the presenta-
tion of possible happiness, the artwork de-
spairs both of its own possibility and that of
its audience. It may be true that regressive
listeners are currently incapable of receiving
an artwork as a synthesized whole, but
Adorno’s demands would ensure that they
remain incapable of doing so. Ironically,
Adorno’s ascetic artwork is precisely what
the “pseudo-activity” of Benjamin’s “ex-
pert” is accused of being—the dutiful repro-





1. Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Econ-
omy, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling
(New York: The Modern Library/Charles H. Kerr
and Company, 1906), p. 83.
2. Ibid., p. 84.
3. Ibid., p. 83.
4. Ibid., p. 93.
5. Ibid.
6. Sigmund Freud, “Fetishism,” in The Standard Edi-
tion of the Complete Psychological Works of
Sigmund Freud, trans. James Strachey, (London:
Vintage/Random House, 2001), 21:152–53.
7. Ibid.
8. Note that the child’s interest in the fantasized ma-
ternal phallus is not, according to Freud, an interest
in a body-part qua object. The fetishist preserves
the maternal phallus only because it refutes the fa-
ther’s threat of castration, and not because he de-
sires an object rather than a subject. Its existence is
necessary in order for the child to defy the prohibi-
tion of incest; it represents the safety, and hence
the possibility, of an authentic relation to another
subject.
9. Freud, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, in
The Standard Edition, 7:153.
10. It should be emphasized that Freud does not distin-
guish deviations from heterosexuality in norma-
tive terms. However, he does consider “pathologi-
cal” those forms of sexuality which (as can be the
case in fetishism) renounce the instinctual aim of
the removal of the organic stimulus of the in-
stinct—i.e., the renunciation of sexual satisfaction
(ibid., pp. 154 and 161). The analogy to Marxian
alienation holds for both pathological and
non-pathological forms of Freudian fetishism,
since in both cases a relation to an object replaces a
relation to a subject.
11. Walter Benjamin, “On Some Motifs in
Baudelaire,” in Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt,
trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken Books,
1969), p. 188.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid. See also Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art
in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” in Illu-
minations, Section III, pp. 222–23.
14. Benjamin, “Work of Art,” p. 220.
15. Ibid., 221.
16. Theodor W. Adorno, “On the Fetish Character in
Music and the Regression of Listening,” trans.
Maurice Goldbloom, in The Essential Frankfurt
School Reader, ed. Andrew Arato and Eike
Gebhardt (New York: The Continuum Publishing
Company, 1998), p. 279.
17. Ibid., 290. Compare Freud, “Splitting of the Ego in
the Process of Defense,” The Standard Edition,
23:277, “He [the fetishist] created a substitute for
PHILOSOPHY TODAY
442
the penis which he missed in females. . . . He ef-
fected no more than a displacement of value.”
18. Marx, Capital, p. 84.
19. The difference between the two can be compared
to the Freudian distinction between non-patholog-
ical and pathological fetishism. In non-pathologi-
cal fetishism, the aim of a sexual relation with the
mother is not given up, but preserved through the
fetish. The fetish as phallic substitute preserves the
child’s identification with the mother, and denies
the threat of castration. By mediating his relation-
ship to another subject with an object that repre-
sents her identity to and safety for his own body, he
establishes a fantasized relation to that subject. In
pathological fetishism, on the contrary, the sexual
aim—and with it the desire for a sexual relation
with another subject—is given up as inferior to the
fetish. The fetish no longer mediates between the
child and another subject, but instead becomes the
sole object of desire. In both cases, the privation of
authentic sexual satisfaction is not acknowledged.
20. Benjamin, “Baudelaire,” p. 194.
21. Benjamin, “Work of Art,” p. 223.
22. Ibid., p. 221.
23. Benjamin, “Baudelaire,” p. 194.
24. Ibid., 175. See also “Work of Art,” p. 250, note 19.
25. Benjamin, “Baudelaire,” pp. 160–62.
26. Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, in The Stan-
dard Edition, 18:31–32.
27. Benjamin, “Baudelaire,” p. 175.
28. Benjamin, “Work of Art,” p. 270.
29. Ibid., p. 238.
30. Ibid., p. 240.
31. Ibid., p. 238.
32. Ibid., p. 240.
33. Ibid., p. 239.
34. Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 18:15.
35. Freud, The Ego and the Id, in The Standard Edi-
tion, 19:34.
36. Benjamin, “Work of Art,” pp. 228–29.
37. Ibid., p. 231.
38. Adorno, “On the Fetish Character in Music,” p.
287.
39. Ibid., pp. 287–88.
40. Ibid., p. 286. See also p. 287: “Together with sport
and film, mass music and the new listening help to
make escape from the whole infantile milieu im-
possible. The sickness has a preservative
function.” And see pp. 291–92: “Their [regressive
listeners’] revolts against fetishism only entangle
them more deeply in it.”
41. Ibid., p. 286.
42. Ibid., 290. See also pp. 286–87: “They are not
merely turned away from more important music,
but they are confirmed in their neurotic stupid-
ity…the assent to hit songs and debased cultural
goods belongs to the same complex of symptoms as
do those faces of which one no longer knows
whether the film has alienated them from reality or
reality has alienated them from the film . . .” (my
emphasis).
43. See also Adorno, p. 278: “values are consumed and
draw feelings to themselves, without their specific
qualities being reached by the consciousness of the
consumer,” and p. 286: “the listening subjects lose,
along with freedom of choice and responsibility,
the capacity for conscious perception of music.”
This is actually more consistent with psychosis
than neurosis. Freud describes the former as dis-
avowal of an external reality, the latter as repres-
sion of an instinct (“Fetishism,” p. 155). Nonethe-
less, in both cases, a threatening idea is withheld
from consciousness.
44. Freud, “The Splitting of the Ego in the Process of
Defence,” The Standard Edition, 23:275–76,
“Both of the parties to the dispute obtain their
share: the instinct is allowed to retain its satisfac-
tion and proper respect is shown to reality.”
45. The sexual fetishist does not believe the castration
threat, since the presence of the fetish prevents the
seeming verification of that threat. Consequently,
the fetishist does not believe that a non-fetishistic
sexual relation with another subject is impossible,
only that it is not desired. The alternative to fetish-
ism is recognized, but devalued.
46. Adorno, “On the Fetish Character in Music,” p.
278: “This is the real secret of success. It is the
mere reflection of what one pays in the market for
the product. The consumer is really worshipping
the money that he himself has paid for the ticket to
the Toscanini concert.”
University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario M5S 1A1, Canada
ADORNO AND BENJAMIN
443
47. Ibid., p. 286.
48. Ibid., p. 280.
49. For example, two nearly identical commodities
with drastically different exchange-values defy
the fetishistic equation of exchange-value and
use-value. A commodity fetishist would believe
that the object of higher exchange-value is more
satisfying, a belief made impossible by an ex-
tremely close qualitative similarity between the
objects. In addition, the standardization of com-
modities makes the strategy of reconciliation
through possession unnecessary. If a new com-
modity is identical to one already possessed—i.e.,
if it is overly familiar—it lacks the threat of alien-
ation that motivates consumption. Without an as-
pect of “terror” (as Adorno describes it) or “shock”
(as Benjamin puts it) there is no need to, in
Adorno’s words, “purchase spiritual peace by
making the imposed goods literally [one’s] own
thing” (p. 287). In Benjamin’s language, there is
no need for shock training when commodities
cease to shock. This results in indifference to new
commodities through familiarity (Benjamin’s
“habit”)—despite the fetishistic allure of their ex-
change-value.
50. Ibid., p. 288.
51. Ibid., p. 290.
52. Ibid., p. 286.
53. Compare ibid., p. 297: “But technically consistent,
harmonious mass music purified of all the ele-
ments of bad pretense would turn into art music
and at once lose its mass basis. All attempts at rec-
onciliation, whether by market-oriented artists or
collectively-oriented art educators, are fruitless.”
Such severely pessimistic conclusions in
Adorno’s essay bear strong traits of Marxian alien-
ation, the illusion that the given exhausts the possi-
bilities of the real.
54. Freud, The Ego and the Id, pp. 34–35.
55. Freud, “The Economic Problem of Masochism,”
The Standard Edition, 19:167.
56. Adorno, “On the Fetish Character in Music,” p.
292.
57. Ibid., p. 294.
58. See, for example, “Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth
Century,” in Reflections (New York: Harvest/HBJ
Books, 1979), 148: “In the dream in which, before
the eyes of each epoch, that which is to follow ap-
pears in images, the latter appears wedded to ele-
ments from prehistory, that is, of a classless soci-
ety. Intimations of this, deposited in the
unconscious of the collective, mingle with the new
to produce the utopia that has left its traces in thou-
sands of configurations of life, from permanent
buildings to fleeting fashions.”
59. Adorno, “On the Fetish Character in Music,” p.
273.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid., p. 276.
62. Ibid., p. 273.
63. Ibid., p. 274.
